Figure 11.5(a) shows that long-term capital flows to developing countries have declined since
1998, mainly due to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8 and the recent slowdown of the global
economy. New long-term flows totaled $261 billion in 2002, $83 billion below the peak in 1997.
Sharp declines in private capital market flows in recent years – bank loans, bonds, and portfolio
equity flows – account for nearly all of this decline. As a result, the share of emerging markets
in global capital market financing fell to 3 percent in 2002, compared to 6.4 percent in 1998
and 11 percent in 1997. Figure 11.5(b) shows that even foreign direct investment (FDI), which
tends to be more resilient than capital market flows, has slowly but steadily declined since 1999.
Rotation from debt to equity
The weakness in the growth of private-sector debt flows is unprecedented in the post-1965
period. In the decade of the 1970s, developing-country debt posted a compound annual growth
rate of 24 percent. The Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s slowed this growth but did
not end it. Since the middle of 1998, however, the whole context for development financing has
shifted. As borrowers have chosen, or been required by their creditors, to pay down their debts,
the external debt of developing countries has fallen in dollar terms. As debt is being repaid to
private-sector creditors, net equity flows to developing countries remain significant, mainly
though the route of FDI.
The shifting pattern of private flows – debt down, equity up – has had an important impli-
cation for the associated stock of debt (see table 11.6). While the stock of developing country
external debt outstanding from all sources has fallen since 1998, the stock of equity capital owned
and controlled by foreigners has risen over the past decade. Table 11.6 shows that the drop in
the external debt-to-equity ratio, from 316 percent in 1997 to 196 percent in 2002, has been
spread across all regions of the developing world. The World Bank highlighted three aspects of
the shift in its 2004 Global Development Finance . First, the shift is partly driven by investor
preferences. Debt investors have become more wary of holding debt claims on developing coun-
tries, while MNCs have increasingly come to believe that the developing world offers significant
growth opportunities. Second, the shift is privately driven by the preferences of developing
country policy-makers. To protect against debt crises, such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8,
countries have strengthened their precautionary reserve holdings and shifted their liabilities to
more stable form of investment, especially FDI. Finally, on balance, the shift is a positive devel-
opment. This rotation from debt to equity is best seen as a constructive development, because it
puts development finance on a stable footing.
1998, mainly due to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8 and the recent slowdown of the global
economy. New long-term flows totaled $261 billion in 2002, $83 billion below the peak in 1997.
Sharp declines in private capital market flows in recent years – bank loans, bonds, and portfolio
equity flows – account for nearly all of this decline. As a result, the share of emerging markets
in global capital market financing fell to 3 percent in 2002, compared to 6.4 percent in 1998
and 11 percent in 1997. Figure 11.5(b) shows that even foreign direct investment (FDI), which
tends to be more resilient than capital market flows, has slowly but steadily declined since 1999.
Rotation from debt to equity
The weakness in the growth of private-sector debt flows is unprecedented in the post-1965
period. In the decade of the 1970s, developing-country debt posted a compound annual growth
rate of 24 percent. The Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s slowed this growth but did
not end it. Since the middle of 1998, however, the whole context for development financing has
shifted. As borrowers have chosen, or been required by their creditors, to pay down their debts,
the external debt of developing countries has fallen in dollar terms. As debt is being repaid to
private-sector creditors, net equity flows to developing countries remain significant, mainly
though the route of FDI.
The shifting pattern of private flows – debt down, equity up – has had an important impli-
cation for the associated stock of debt (see table 11.6). While the stock of developing country
external debt outstanding from all sources has fallen since 1998, the stock of equity capital owned
and controlled by foreigners has risen over the past decade. Table 11.6 shows that the drop in
the external debt-to-equity ratio, from 316 percent in 1997 to 196 percent in 2002, has been
spread across all regions of the developing world. The World Bank highlighted three aspects of
the shift in its 2004 Global Development Finance . First, the shift is partly driven by investor
preferences. Debt investors have become more wary of holding debt claims on developing coun-
tries, while MNCs have increasingly come to believe that the developing world offers significant
growth opportunities. Second, the shift is privately driven by the preferences of developing
country policy-makers. To protect against debt crises, such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8,
countries have strengthened their precautionary reserve holdings and shifted their liabilities to
more stable form of investment, especially FDI. Finally, on balance, the shift is a positive devel-
opment. This rotation from debt to equity is best seen as a constructive development, because it
puts development finance on a stable footing.